

Extracts from translation of Memorandum entitled:  
"Minutes of a conference on 23 May 39"

§§§§

Place: The Fuehrer's Study, New Reich Chancellery.

Adjutant on duty: Lt.Col. (G.S.) Schmundt.

Present: The Fuehrer, Field Marshal Goering, Grand Admiral Raeder, Col-Gen Milch, Gen (of Artillery) Halder, Gen. Bodenschatz, Rear-Adml. Schniewindt, Col. (G.S.) Jeschonnek, Col.(G.S.) Warlimont, Lt.Col. (G.S.) Schmundt, Capt Engel (Army), Lt-Comdr Albrecht, Capt von Below (Army).

Subject: Indoctrination on the political situation and future aims.

§§§§

A mass of 80 million people has solved the ideological problems. So, too, must the economic problems be solved. No German can evade the creation of the necessary economic conditions for this. The solution of the problems demands courage. The principle, by which one evades solving the problem by adapting oneself to circumstances, is inadmissible. Circumstances must rather be adapted to aims. This is impossible without invasion of foreign states or attacks upon foreign property.

Living space, in proportion to the magnitude of the state, is the basis of all power. One may refuse for a time to face the problem, but finally it is solved one way or the other. The choice is between advancement or decline. In 15 or 20 years time we shall be compelled to find a solution! No German statesman can evade the question longer than that.

§§§§

The national-political unity of the Germans has been achieved, apart from minor exceptions. Further successes cannot be attained without the shedding of blood.

The demarcation of frontiers is of military importance.

The Pole is no "supplementary enemy". Poland will always be on the side of our adversaries. In spite of treaties of friendship Poland has always had the secret intention of exploiting every opportunity to do us harm.

§§§§

The Polish problem is inseparable from conflict with the West. Poland's internal power of resistance to Bolshevism is doubtful. Thus Poland is of doubtful value as a barrier against Russia.

It is questionable whether military success in the West can be

achieved by a quick decision, questionable too is the attitude of Poland.

The Polish Government will not resist pressure from Russia. Poland sees danger in a German victory in the West, and will attempt to rob us of the victory.

There is therefore no question of sparing Poland, and we are left with the decision:

To attack Poland at the first suitable opportunity.

We cannot expect a repetition of the Czech affair. There will be war. Our task is to isolate Poland. The success of the isolation will be decisive.

Therefore the Fuehrer must reserve the right to give the final order to attack. There must be no simultaneous conflict with the Western Powers (France and England).

If it is not certain that a German-Polish conflict will not lead to war in the West, then the fight must be primarily against England and France.

Fundamentally therefore; conflict with Poland - beginning with an attack on Poland - will only be successful if the Western powers keep out of it. If this is impossible then it will be better to attack in the West and to settle Poland at the same time.

The isolation of Poland is a matter of skilful politics.

\$\$\$\$

certified correct record

(signed) Schmundt, Lt.Col.