

OFFICE OF U. S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL
FOR THE PROSECUTION OF AXIS CRIMINALITY

INTERROGATION DIVISION SUMMARY

Interrogation of JODL, Alfred
By: Lt. Colonel Hinkel, 28 October 1945, p.m.

PERSONS AND ORGANIZATIONS IMPLICATED, AND SUBJECTS

1. JODL
 - a. Aggressive war
 - (1) Czechoslovakia (1)
 - (2) Directives from the Fuehrer through Keitel (3)
 - (3) Outline for the directive "Green"
 - (4) Intention to attack Czechoslovakia (5)
 - (5) Contemplation of incident causing war (6)
 - b. Warning against military conflict by General Beck, Fritsch, and Brauchitsch (7)
 - c. Purpose of rearmament (8)
 - d. Treaty of Versailles (11)
 - e. Anschluss
 - (1) Military problem (13-15)
 - f. Aggressive war against Poland (15, 16)
 - g. Test on Czechoslovakia fortifications (18-21)

AGGRESSIVE WAR - Czechoslovakia.

Jodl states that the document (Secret command matter-addressed to Chief of OKW, Berlin, Date: 20 May 1938) shown him in the morning interrogation (same date) refreshed his memory in regard to preparations made in view of the war against Czechoslovakia. This sketch was not his own work, but the result of conferences held with the Fuehrer (p.1). Jodl himself never attended conferences with the Fuehrer before the war. Sketch in question is the result of early directives made by the General Staff to cope with the political situation, as it presented itself. (p.2).

Keitel, after attending conferences with Hitler, would inform Jodl on the general intentions of the Fuehrer, on which the sketches were to be based. "He, (Keitel) gave us instructions to have in view a possible conflict with Czechoslovakia". Political directions were invariably made by the Fuehrer, given to Keitel, who relayed them to Jodl; they never emanated from the Foreign Office. (p.3).

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Paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 of the document, under the heading "Outline for the Directive Green", were prepared by the Staff. Sections 1, 2 and 3 constitute the views of the Fuehrer on the Czechoslovakia operation (4). They merely pertain to an eventuality.

"We all had the belief that these problems would solve themselves without any recourse to force". Jodl admits, however that: "In view of the condition of the world at that time, the Fuehrer had the idea of attacking Czechoslovakia." (p.5)

Jodl personally did not regard the opportunity for an attack favorably, but as a soldier, had to be prepared for such an emergency. All military people were opposed to action which might lead to war, but wanted 3 1/2 million Germans in Czechoslovakia re-united with the Reich.

Q. "Didn't you contemplate, in your own plans, the creation of an incident from which war could be waged?"

A. "Yes, but on the express presumption that a war would be unavoidable." Maintains that this sketch was not conducive to creating a warlike atmosphere, but was merely one of the regular duties of a military General Staff. (6).

General Beck, Fritsch and Brauchitsch had repeatedly warned Hitler against "a military conflict at the present time". This led to a conflict between the Fuehrer and the General Staff which lasted throughout the war. (7). The General Staff could only express its disagreement verbally since all its members were under oath. Only Beck resigned, (8).

Asserts General Staff saw in rearmament only an instrument to become a sovereign state as in 1918 (8). Confirms his previous statement to the effect that the German Army was being re-established in order to correct what were considered to be injustices of the Versailles Treaty. Jodl states, in this connection: "One might say of this last war, that it was, perhaps, accomplished by Germany, but of the previous war I must stress most stress most emphatically that we were dragged into it in spite of ourselves". Jodl himself advocated limiting the expansion of German space to those frontiers existing prior to Versailles. (11).

Believes that the Fuehrer wanted at that time merely to reunite Germany and Czechoslovakia, but agrees that "under certain conditions he would be resorted to war". Does not know whether Hitler had other objectives than those of re-uniting the Sudeten Germans. (12).

ANSWERSS NO MILITARY PROBLEM

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ANSCHLUSS NO MILITARY PROBLEM

Jodl asserts that to military circles, the Anschluss with Austria presented no problem, since they knew it would not necessitate military action. (13)

Denies there was any propaganda stirring German public opinion with regard to Austria. (14)

In Jodl's opinions, Germany's main objective in regard to living space would have been achieved with the reunion of Sudetenland, the return of Austria, the re-establishment of the link between West and East Prussia, and the return of Danzig (14), but he had no occasion to express his opinion since he left the OKW in 1938 to command the 44th Artillery Division in Vienna, remaining there until August, 1939, when he was recalled to Berlin as Head of the General Staff. (15).

AGGRESSIVE WAR - POLAND

Did not attend meeting of General Officers in Obersalzberg on 22 August 1939 but knows they were addressed by Hitler regarding the possibility of a war with Poland. The invasion of Poland was decided by the time he reached Berlin. (15).

Believes meeting in question was attended by Keitel, List, Reichenau, Blaskowitz and Goering. (16) Beck had tendered his resignation as Head of the OKW in Autumn of 1938 and was replaced by Keitel. Jodl is certain Beck was not at that meeting because he was in disgrace with Hitler. Brauchitsch was head of the Army; Halder, chief of Staff. (17).

TESTS ON CZECH FORTIFICATIONS

Admits that Czech fortifications taken over by the Germans as a result of the Munich agreement were of similar design as the Maginot Line, and that tests were made on a very strong part of the Czech border to determine their degree of resistance. (18) Admits that the best way of attacking fortifications was determined at that time. Denies that it was one of the terms of the Munich pact to leave the fortifications intact in order to make tests, since "such tests could have been made at our own fortifications". (19).

Jodl volunteers the opinion that the German march into Bohemia and Moravia brought on the world war. Does not agree with the steps taken by the Fuehrer, since it turned world opinion, which was with Germany up to Munich, against Germany. Asked what action he took after Munich and the Anschluss, Jodl states, "I could not do anything because I was transferred and had nothing more to do with it." (21).